MoonOverPittsburgh

Some tiny creature, mad with wrath,

Is coming nearer on the path.

--Edward Gorey

Name:
Location: Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, U.S. Outlying Islands

Writer, lawyer, cyclist, rock climber, wanderer of dark residential streets, friend.

Friday, May 05, 2006

Understanding the System

By all accounts, sentencing in the Zacarias Moussaoui trial was, in its way, riveting. I have not followed the goings on in that trial closely for a variety of reasons I am not inclined to go into here. Probably, it boils down to a combination of his plea and my displeasure with the death penalty; although I wouldn't have been surprised had he been sentenced to die, I'm hardly upset that he won't be executed and granted the martyrdom he so fervently seeks. As Judge Brinkema observed, in effect, there really is no more ignominious end than to rot in a Supermax prison.

One thing jumped out at me, however -- a victim statement following sentencing:

Judge Brinkema asked whether there were any family members of victims of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the audience who wanted to be heard.

No one responded initially. As the judge prepared to move on, Rosemary Dillard, whose husband died on American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon, rose from the audience.

Walking to a lectern a few feet from Mr. Moussaoui, Mrs. Dillard looked at him and said: "I want you, Mr. Moussaoui, to know how you wrecked my life. You wrecked my career. You took the most important person in my life from me."

As Mr. Moussaoui stared back impassively, she continued, "I hope that you sit in that jail without seeing the sky, without seeing the sun, without any contact with the world and that your name never comes up in any newspaper again during the rest of my life."

She then thanked the judge for "what you did," thanked the prosecutors "for what you tried to do," and the court-appointed defense lawyers for "what you had to do."

That last little bit, reflecting an abiding appreciation of the role of defense attorneys in our system, floors me in its simplicity. I don't know what Mrs. Dillard does that led her to include that gratuity at an intensely personal moment, but as someone who believes strongly in the critical importance of the criminal defense bar, and thinks it incumbent on any attorney to take the occasional case he or she finds distasteful as a matter of service, charity, and humility, I'm grateful for her choice to include that last expression of appreciation -- even if it was no more than a matter of basic politeness.

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Sunday, February 20, 2005

Commonplace, Gass

for N., upon Proust

For all those not in love there's law: to rule . . . to regulate . . . to rectify. I cannot write the poetry of such proposals, the poetry of politics, though sometimes -- often -- always now -- I am in that uneasy peace of equal powers which makes a state; then I communicate by passing papers, proclamations, orders, through my bowels. Yet I was not a state with you, nor were we both together any Indiana.

--William Gass, In the Heart of the Heart of the Country and Other Stories 175 (Nonpareil 2000 (orig. 1968)

not so much responding to Proust as prompted by . . . or something.

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Friday, February 18, 2005

Bob Novak and the Get Out of Jail Free Card?

There continues to be an awful lot of discussion of why, if the Times Judith Miller, who never wrote about Valerie Plame's identity, and Time's Matthew Cooper, who didn't break the story, both face 18 months in prison, Bob Novak, who broke the whole story has never been reported even to have appeared within a mile of the Plame leak grand jury.

The PG's Tony Norman expresses some of the confusion many of us feel, and expresses well the exasperation of most everyone who has followed this story, especially those of us with serious First Amendment concerns about the pending imprisonment of Miller and Cooper to begin with.

Congressional investigations were threatened and a grand jury convened. In the perverse logic of the nation's capital, subpoenas were sent to reporters who merely sat on the information Novak published. While Miller and Cooper face serious jail time for upholding the principle of source confidentiality, Novak continues perfecting his million-dollar scowl on "Crossfire."

It's worth emphasizing that Novak may well have been called to testify, may have appeared, and may have "sung like a canary," in the words of Slate "Explainer" Daniel Engber. As Engber does a good job explaining, grand juries historically have been confidential, and their secrets are often better protected than other political secrets. This is important, and there's nothing wrong with it.

But as far as I'm concerned, where Miller and Cooper go so should go Novak, unless he has, indeed, disclosed the name of the administration official who leaked the story, in which case perhaps Novak deserves a deal provided the official is removed from his office and given the same prison term I would have gotten if I'd disclosed the identity of a clandestine operative overseas in violation of federal law.

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Thursday, February 17, 2005

Class Action -- Reform or Emasculation

As some of you surely have noted, I've done an abysmal job of steering this blog away from the politics that threaten to swamp it in due proportion to the degree to which politics threatens to swamp the blog's author. The AP provides an adequate baseline discussion of what the House did today, in decisively approving pending legislation purporting to streamline and centralize the class action process in the federal courts.

The gist of the legislation is that class action lawsuits that used to be subject to the jurisdiction of courts in virtually any state in which an injured party resides, an injury occurs, or a corporate defendant is located, now will have to be brought in already overwhelmed federal courts. Aside from clogging up the system, this will also have the effect of diminishing the frequency and volume of class action rewards, as federal courts have proven far less sympathetic than many state courts to sweeping multi-state litigation.

Needless to say, not everyone's happy, and some people are seeing through the anti-class action attorney rhetoric, which is the same red herring here that it is in most contexts. Speaking of which, this account of what's in store:

"Today we will attempt to pre-empt state class action," said Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich. "Next month we will take up a bankruptcy bill that massively tilts the playing field in favor of credit card companies and against ordinary consumers and workers alike. On deck are equally one-sided medical malpractice bills and asbestos bills that both cap damages and eliminate liability to protect some of the most egregious wrongdoing in America."

Now I could do this at much greater length, could provide any number of sources of discussion on this point, but I don't want to belabor what I see as a couple of simple points I can just gloss over at a common-sense level, each corresponding to a stated rationale for this supposedly ground-breaking reform (italicized descriptions of rationales taken from the same AP article, though they are surely available in any complete article).

1. The president has described class-action suits as often frivolous . . .

Really? How often? Which kinds? And what, precisely, do we consider to be frivolous? How easily we forget Ralph Nader's industry-shaking exposure of the Ford Pinto scandal. How easily we forget the atrocious case highlighted in A Civil Action (which, those familiar with the story will recall, ended with a relatively paltry award). If regulation is insufficient, and the one strong tool consumers have is vitiated or effectively eliminated, how can the people keep corporations in line?

2. [B]usinesses complain that state judges and juries have been too generous to plaintiffs.

Which is to say, if I'm not mistaken, that businesses don't like the jury system. So, when it comes to things like political speech, businesses want to be treated like individuals, but when it comes to being held culpable for misconduct, juries are, what, unqualified? Isn't that the task of corporate defense lawyers -- to make sure juries understand why this egregious suit is being brought against their blameless corporation in violation of all that is good and decent in the world. Oh, wait, what? Your army of $300/hour attorneys can't convince 12 perfectly honorable citizens in Mississippi of that fact? Could that be because it isn't true? Just maybe? Here's my feeling: if a jury can hold a criminal defendant's life in its hands, then I think it can handle doling out an award for a class of people collectively injured by knowing corporate misconduct. Call me crazy . . .

3. Bush: "This bill is an important step forward in our efforts to reform the litigation system and to continue creating jobs and growing our economy . . ."

Reforming the litigation system? In the literal re-forming sense, sure: this is profession-changing stuff. Creating jobs? What, because corporations are going to keep so much more of their money that they'll shower it on new employees? That they'll break ground in entirely new industries? Why has this recovery been mostly jobless? Because corporations are reaping the benefits of enhanced productivity, and because when they don't have to, they choose not to hire more people. Growing our economy? This is zero sum stuff. Either businesses spend that money or lawyers and consumers do. Few corporations are going out of business due to this stuff. Costs may be passed on to consumers, but a few million dollars here and there to attorneys from multi-billion dollar corporations is not breaking the bank. And to the extent serious costs are passed on, it's where corporations have had to change the way they did business. Like, for example, shielding gas tanks to prevent explosions that kill these same consumers. Keeping corporations honest in some industries quite literally saves lives. How's that for the economy?

4. Bush, the GOP and the business community [. . .]have criticized what they see as a litigation crisis that enables lawyers to reap huge profits while businesses and consumers are stuck with the bill.

It stands to reason that our supposedly free-market MBA president would want to redistribute wealth from attorneys to MBA's, doesn't it? Seriously, what they're referring to here is the concern that class action lawyers' clients "get only small sums or coupons giving them discounts for products of the company they just sued," while the attorneys rake in multi-million dollar fees. Indeed, this is often the case.

Many of us have received such coupons over the years, and they are pretty trivial on an individual level. But return to my earlier point regarding corporate culpability. Again the analogy: to an American citizen who lives and breathes, his freedom is his most prized possession. When he commits a crime against an individual or the community, he loses that freedom. Unless he's a corporate executive. Meanwhile, to a corporation qua entity, its bottom line is its most prized possession. All hail the almighty shareholder, right? Well then doesn't it make sense that it is by dipping into its coffers when it steps out of line that we most effectively punish a corporation? Of course. Practically speaking, it's the only way.

That's what class action lawsuits are and have always been about. So yeah, it's relatively unimportant to me that a few years back I received as compensation for years of billing misconduct a coupon good for about $20 of Verizon-sold hardware. But if everyone who received one of those coupons redeemed it, what do you suppose that would cost Verizon? Millions, of course. And yes, the attorneys in that case surely reaped millions. They also probably worked for years and years on that case, like most others. And last I checked, a lawyer's time is pretty expensive. Moreover, if there isn't that financial incentive, lawyers won't take these cases. And if they don't take these cases, consumers have to rely on regulatory bodies to protect them, which these days is pretty cold comfort.

I don't participate in opt-in class actions because I care about what I might get. Rather, I opt in because in so doing, the corporate defendant is forced to justify its conduct. If it has a fair case, and good attorneys, it will convince the jury. And if it doesn't, then it pays. Lawyers make some money, I make virtually nothing, but of crucial importance is the price paid by the corporation. That's what's important. And I guarantee that with a sufficient payout, corporations will wake up and take notice, and change conduct to avoid future liability. And such changes almost invariably favor consumers in the long run.

Lawyers are not the problem here. Neither are juries. It's just another example of corporations doing what they must -- aiming to milk the market for every penny it can get. Corporate political donations to politicians and fees paid to lobbying firms are loss leaders -- and today they have been handsomely rewarded, to the detriment of consumers, who will suffer far more than the lawyers will under the yoke of this corporate-friendly legislation.

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Wednesday, February 16, 2005

Why You Never Want a Lawyer at Your Party

From The Onion:

With my client's long-standing dental problems established, I'll proceed. Last year, during the first weeks of baseball season, my client found what he described as "the aching in his molars" to be increasing in intensity. This statement was borne out by the vocal and voluntary testimony of my client's colleagues, who swore to the frequency and volume of my client's entreaties for solace from his pain. My client's dental-insurance statement would confirm that, on the advice of medical counsel, my client had the problematic teeth removed and was fitted for a set of dentures, henceforth referred to as "false teeth." My client had hoped the false teeth would not only put an end to his pain, but offer cosmetic benefits over his inferior natural teeth. Sadly, I have no examples to offer in exhibit, but offer as an analogue Mr. Wilbright's artificial hairpiece...

In light of the objections, I withdraw my comments regarding Mr. Wilbright.

I don't know whether to laugh or cry.

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Saturday, February 12, 2005

Science v. Religion, cont'd

This is a lively discussion, so I'd like to keep it on the front page. Joe Kearns, in response to my initial post on this topic, writes in part:

To teach science as if it were Truth is a violation of the spirit of science, which is always aware of its unanswered questions. The teaching of the "time plus chance" paradigm of Darwinism as "received fact" leads the young non-scientist to believe what ain't so...that "scientists believe" this answers all the origin questions. They do not. There is a real problem with the paradigm, and that problem raises a real question whether we live in a "closed system" (the a-theistic view) or an "open system" (the someone/something else is out there messin with us view.) You might find it interesting to note that Francis Crick, along with several other atheistic scientists, believe in "panspermia", the idea that life evolved outside our planet and was planted here, precisely because of problems with the paradigm like those pointed out by Behe. To say with the authority of a teacher or a textbook, "science has found no need for a creator in its explanations of the world" is a religious statement, and simply untrue to boot.

Can we really interpret the 1st Amendment to disallow the discussion whether a creator exists? Especially when our scientists are haveing precisely that debate?


First, I want to reemphasize that while in the abstract, I am hard-pressed to mount a compelling argument for denying children in public school access to this debate, if not for purposes of hinting at some metaphysical truth than perhaps as an object lesson in the nature of scientific inquiry, I am still troubled by the evidence I see of what actually happens when such an endeavor comes to be. I also should acknowledge my limitations in this discussion, insofar as my knowledge of what various school systems have been doing is restricted to what I read in newspapers and the blogosphere. I wouldn't bet my whole stack of chips on either of their myriad recommendations. Furthermore, I have to object gently to Kearns' implicitly instrumentalist approach to the First Amendment. I have worked for a number of judges, at the state and federal level. I submit that most judges, notwithstanding their leanings, would express grave concern about couching the interpretation of the Bill of Rights strictly in terms of what result a given interpretation may or may not have, the Right's empirically incoherent alarums about an "activist judiciary" notwithstanding. None of which means there isn't a legitimate question there; it's merely an objection to loose terminology in a tight area of law: to frame it circularly and yet I think accurately, we will interpret the First Amendment precisely as we should, based not on whether the Framers' short-sightedness engendered an amendment ill-equipped to accommodate the teleological debates of future centuries, but on what the amendment says (about the discovery of which, debate will ever rage, but should never reduce to "because this interpretation would cause this, it simply must be the wrong interpretation," such normative judgments having only a modest role in American jurisprudence), mindful that if it proves problematic enough it can be changed through the democratic process (although I wouldn't hold my breath until that happens). Of course, this hardly means that the First Amendment's implications for public education are clear or settled; neither is true, as evidenced by the ongoing debate.

Kearns and I agree that problems with, or limitations of Darwinian theory ought to be openly acknowledged. Legitimate alternatives warrant exploration. I feel the same way about the teaching of history. That I may have arrived at certain conclusions about the reasons for this or that event, or the intrinsic worth of this or that decision and outcome, I wouldn't deny our children access to as much historical data as possible so that they might form their own opinions. This is the nature of critical inquiry, and it ought to be the essence of our children's education. Sadly, it is not; the ability to think critically is being sundered to various ideogically loaded sacred cows and market imperatives. This bodes poorly for all sides of the debate: neither will Darwin nor ID be viewed with the sort of jaundiced skepticism that I think all claims to Fundamental Truth ought to be.

It's misleading, however, to claim that scientists simply do not believe Darwin works as a theory -- though I will readily grant that an assertion that a given theoretical framework obviates the explanatory need for a designer qua deity is, in some limited sense, a religous claim and ought to be evaluated on the same terms as any other religious claims. Natural selection as a complete theory retains its accomplished, articulate bevy of advocates. The late Stephen Gould comes to mind. That Hawking continues to struggle against the idea of a theological explanation does not discredit him per se -- most would agree he is among the most brilliant scientists the world has known. It's unfair to ascribe to him a truculence, as though even were his explorations to lead him ineluctably to a deistic explanation he would reject it as part of some conspiracy-of-one to mislead the world. Furthermore, we find more than just ID or Frick's "panspermia" proffered up as theoretical constructs to help us get from there to here. Robert Wright's Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, while focusing on the past few tens of thousands of years of human development, posits various constructs for understanding a sort of directedness to evolution that requires no designer or creator. Granted, Wright does not attempt to account for the early leaps of complexity that Behe identifies as the biggest problems for NS, but it still might inform the debate. Kurzweil's work on machine intelligence and perhaps spirituality (his word) also might bear on the topic. And I'm confident that there are others.

The problem -- and the source of my reflexive concern vis-a-vis education -- is that it's wrongheaded to treat NS and ID (taking two dominant examples and letting them stand in for the larger spectrum of accounts) as mutually inconsistent. As I understand Behe's ID, it wouldn't supplant NS. Rather, it takes the fossil record and the evidence of widespread and sweeping natural adaptation as granted. The principle issue is that there is a gap in the NS account, and ID offers an explanation at least as credible as any other. As I began to note earlier, I don't thnk this is how the situation is seen among those teachers, administrators, and parents who are most outspoken in their determination to see ID in the classroom. For those NS-is-just-a-theory types, ID does or ought to supplant Darwin's account as the superior account -- not for its ability to address small problems in an exhaustively documented, verified, and predictive theory but for its suggestion of something wholly outside that theory. That's not Behe's ID, and it's not one that I think is defensible in public education.

The idea of truth is, of course, problematic in the sciences. But as far as theories go, NS has tremendous evidentiary support in its broad strokes -- indeed, I question whether many biological theories are more irrefutable at the general level. Whether some designer interceded early in the process, or whether the initial building blocks came from some extraterrestrial source (which to my mind is the same thing, because if this stuff was too complicated to occur here as posited by NS, it also would have been too complicated to occur spontaneously elsewhere, thus, no matter how long the consequent regress, even Frick's account ultimately requires some first step in establishing complexity somewhere -- in a word, a designer), is irrelevant to whether NS is just another theory when its explanatory power is so robust and its empirical underpinnings so widespread and well understood. If there's a gap somewhere along the way, students should know about it. But that's very different than saying students should be taught that NS theory is merely on a par with others that are less thoroughly validated by such voluminous evidence. That is why I previously said I believed NS is the Alpha and the Omega: should any of these alternative theories go so far as, or be presented as going so far as, to cast into doubt the basic principles of NS, I think they have left the realm of science and broken decisively toward religion (or metaphysics, if you prefer). And it's there that the First Amendment as it has been consistently interpreted comes into play.

Which leads me to qualify an overstatement I made earlier: perhaps it is not impossible to present ID as one possible solution to a fairly fine-grained problem with NS. Maybe that particular (Behe-ian) presentation of ID is entirely acceptable under the First Amendment. I still hold that we would have to be ever vigilant with regard to the individual treatments of the issue by the many educators who have indicated their willingness to use the chalkboard as a pulpit.

And now if you'll excuse me, my brain hurts.

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Friday, February 11, 2005

"In the Case of Science vs. Nature . . . "

The title, perhaps, is a bit misleading, but it makes me giggle. In any event, this post at Dialogical Coffee House led me to this article at ReasonOnline, which in turn led me to the Times Op-Ed that engendered this latest round in the ongoing debate.

The Times piece, by Michael J. Behe, a professor of biological science at Lehigh University, aims to dispel what he argues are popular mis-associations of so-called "Intelligent Design" theory with those who would have public schools reject Darwin's natural selection as, at best, "just a theory," if not omitting to mention it entirely (sadly, something plenty of people in this country would prefer, as the most recent spate of attempts to do just that plainly illustrates). He speaks to the premises on which Intelligent Design is based, and emphasizes that these principles are not (or should not be) in themselves objectionable to scientists of an Enlightenment / scientific method bent.

In Reason, Ronald Bailey takes issue with Behe -- particularly, Behe's founding the notion of intelligent design on the premise that "there are no research studies indicating that Darwinian processes can make molecular machines of the complexity we find in the cell." Behe's claim is that these molecular machines, or in some cases the cellular machines in which they function are irreducibly complex, and that absent some sort of intelligent design -- which, to be fair, he at least concedes might not be a deity but rather something in nature (a claim the coherence of which exceeds my grasp just now, and one that Bailey explicitly rejects and DCH commenter, Joe Kearns, implicitly rejects, but let's grant it for argument's sake) -- they could not have arrived at their levels of complexity since to remove any one component of the cellular / molecular mechanism would bring the organism's life to a screeching halt. If these irreducible cellular machines were not made of whole cloth, all at once, then they would never have come into being, is the proposition that Bailey ascribes, I think correctly, to Behe. Bailey is, in some sense, quibbling with Behe's attempt to distinguish his ID theory from a purely dogmatic creationist account, and perhaps suggesting that it's a trojan horse.

As a good, the-first-amendment-can-never-be-strong-enough liberal, I'm wary of Behe's arguments for precisely this reason. After all, glazed with a patina of Enlightenment science, religion can become palatable, or rather it can become difficult to persuasively resist by those who recognize it for what it is. It is difficult rationally to object that Darwinism is the Alpha and Omega of life on earth, although that's what ID attempts to do. Darwinism is the best account offered yet, in my opinion and (more importantly) in the opinion of many people smarter than I. But so was Newton's account of mechanics until Einstein came along. And Einstein, for that matter, roundly rejected much of quantum theory that has now been verified or at least appears to be true.

Nevertheless, I fear that this aspect of Bailey's critique is unfair. I'll confess that the phrase Intelligent Design recalls to mind those religious network shows that attempt to mathematically square the prodigious evidence in support of Darwinism with the biblical math favored by their particular Christian denominations to pinpoint a date for the first day of Creation. And I feel like Behe's account clarified some things for me. Moreover, I'm not unfamiliar with Behe's (stated) orientation toward this issue. One of my physics teachers in college, a man who could carry a full tenure-track load in advanced physics and still attend law school at night (which, by the way, makes for an awful professor, since on more than one occasion he used his fastidiously tidy law school notebooks and study methods to illustrate why our note-taking and organizational skills as well as our study (non-)habits were abysmal, and largely to blame for our fate, one and all, as failures at grasping all things electromagnetic), and who was surely in virtue of his background of a devoutly logical inclination, was quite comfortable on one occasion opining -- with a hand-wave and in an astonishingly curt and cursory way -- "Natural selection doesn't get us here from there. Something's missing."

Brian at the Dialogical Coffee House, meanwhile, focuses on two paragraphs in Bailey's piece, in the first of which Bailey asks why ID shouldn't be acknowledged side by side with natural selection as a competing scientific account of life's terrestrial lineage. In virtue of this debate, my answer is less certain than it was, although the second Bailey point Brian highlights has something to do with my feeling that the scientific basis for ID is in some sense beside the point. Bailey observes, "Intelligent design theorists and their claims to scientific legitimacy aside, the only reason the vast majority of people who want intelligent design taught in high school want it is because they believe it will undercut the corrosive effects of evolutionary biology on the religious beliefs of their children." The obverse of this proposition, however, and one Bailey only implicitly acknowledges much earlier in his piece, is that the only reason the areligious or otherly religious would have it kept out of school is their fear that it is a trojan horse in the belly of which it bears scripture, as the Leviathan did Noah.

I should tip my hat on this point to Joe Kearns for his similar comment at DCH. And a propos, Kearns also writes that

[t]he "irreducible complexity" problem pointed out by Behe is philosophically and practically insurmountable, and would deep-six the whole [NS] edifice EXCEPT that there is no god-less alternative theory. Intelligent design is promising because, though it involves a Designer, it does not rely upon any revelation or authoritative knowledge about that Designer, but works outward from the world-as-found, from the material of the world. It therefore avoids the issues of "whose revelation?" In my opinion, this is why you actually find more believers in the science faculties than in the humanities faculties in the secular academy. The physicists are finding themselved forced, by the facts, to consider the existence of God as a compelling inference. ID is the same process, occurring in Biology.

The question, I suppose, is whether both sides are simply doing their respective jobs in pushing against each other from the extreme perimeters of the positions they defend, locked in battle over radically opposed ideas that do not represent the more moderate views of many of the people in whose name such battle is done to much fanfare and distraction (sound familiar)? Should both sides behave, as they have behaved, like lawyers, testing the extremes in hopes that the final result will incrementally favor their clients in direct proportion to the zealousness of their advocacy? When it comes to teaching our children, is an adversarial approach to curricula development appropriate?

I suppose that while my intention here has been more exegetical than critical, I am intrigued by Kearn's choice of words regarding "the existence of God as a compelling inference" (my emphasis). Is that all any scientific conclusion is, "a compelling inference"? I suppose there's a level of brute epistemological truth to this, but when, as Bailey notes, even the Pope grants a certain legitimacy to natural selection (I'm taking Bailey's word for this), I'm not sure that the ID argument for God is as compelling as the NS argument for Darwin's account of evolution, much as Kearns is unconvinced by Bailey's ascription to others the critique that if ID can be taught so should be astrology, phrenology, etc. (oddly, Bailey throws psychoanalysis in there with water-witching; while psychoanalysis may not lay claim to the sort of scientific validity that special relativity does, I don't think I'd file it with a list of debunked quackery that might as well include alchemy for all its validity). But then at the end of the day if it's only a matter of competing likelihoods -- to be reductive, say, Darwin's account is 65% likely to be true and ID's 22% likely to be true -- how do we decide which likelihood prevails, or at what level of likelihood we draw the line (after all, to the extent the teaching of ID is linked to religious creation, how do we draw the line as to which creation stories (and there are probably more of those in the world than there are discrete ethnicities, faiths, etc.) between what we should teach and what we shouldn't.

Which leads me to again don my lawyer hat, and speak to this from a (necessarily abstract) First-Amendment point of view (caveat: I'm woefully underqualified to do so, but hopefully more qualified than at least some of you): If we grant Kearns' point that ID favors no specific religion's creation story, but instead simply posits some designer based on the evidence of the "world-as-found," as he elegantly describes it, does that protect it from First-Amendment scrutiny? Should it? Perhaps. To the extent any one religion's account is barred by First Amendment jurisprudence (and, at least for now, it mostly is), one shouldn't be able to do an end-run by simply taking the specific references to a particular God or source of scripture out of the story. If no proponent of ID can escape the inference of some designer qua deity, than ID has no place in the schools. Why? Because the First Amendment doesn't bar reference to Christianity or Judaism or Islam, per se; rather, it precludes the presentation of scriptural material in public classrooms generally.

On the other hand, public-school history books certainly account for the role of religion in the formation of the modern world, and the religious framework for certain works of art also can be acknowledged and addressed for their contextual relevance. Which might be the saving grace for ID in the schools: the reason those other accounts are permissible, is because they're not scriptural in nature, in no material way construable as proselytizing, but are, as already dubbed, exegetical, contextual. Similarly, one might understand the likely religious overtones of any presentation of ID as incidental precisely because they don't favor any particular creation story's designer. And this is where Behe makes a convincing case: I have trouble seeing, either from a legal or a moral position, how in itself the teaching of ID would be problematic assuming it would be presented as a school of thought that challenges natural selection's most controversial assumptions and argues from the scientific material that undergirds the work of the Behes of the world, as opposed to the naked dogma of, say, a Falwell's account, or, for that matter, the Old Testament's account.

Which brings me back to where I started: Behe presents a fairly persuasive case that ID as understood by its more sophisticated advocates and researchers may well not be terribly religious (in the sense of denominational) in itself. Unfortunately, Bailey also is correct that this issue, rightly or wrongly, has become another battleground for the left and right (by and large), and thus in practice is heavily politicized. The problem is that not only do ID's avatars in many cases have ulterior motives; I think many of those administrators who line up in support of it are no different in their ends, are no more likely to read Behe's scientific defense of ID as a legitimate theory than their leftward opponents. And if battle necessarily pits those sides against each other (yet again) on the text of the Establishment Clause, and ejects from that field those people who make the scientific cases pro and con, well then the goal has to be to minimize the damage either by finding independently minded scientists to provide the ID account and ensure that individual teachers don't stray (an impossible task), or by omitting it altogether. It appears to me that the courts have reached a similar conclusion, though perhaps not by such a tortured path: faced with cases like this, of great moment to the social fabric and with profound First-Amendment implications, judges are hard-pressed to disregard entirely what will really happen in the schools in the event of one or another ruling. And I think that, more than anything else, is why the ID advocates are faring poorly in the courts. I probably agree with this outcome, but more as a pragmatist than as a dyed in the wool lefty.

UPDATE: I realize the title quote is wrongly stated. But I don't want to mess with the permalink. It should read, "In the Case of Science vs. Religion," or something like that. It's a Simpsons quote (of course). Anyone who wants to correct me feel free.

UPDATE 2: This discussion continues here.

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Wednesday, February 09, 2005

On A Lighter Note

No more visible underwear.

The question is, how much do you want to bet this Virginia law would be enforced far more liberally against men than it is against women. And, to be fair, I'd prefer to minimize the deterrent effect on women wearing low-rise jeans, as they might be my single favorite fashion advent of the past decade or so. At the same time, however, if we're going to waste the government's time passing ludicrous laws against utterly inoccuous behavior, we ought to make sure that everyone's equally burdened by the same absurdity, if for no other reason than that by doubling the number of people bothered by the rule the democratic process will probably work faster to repeal any such thong-hibition.

UPDATE: Evidently, Virginia legislators didn't so much like the fact that their constituents and a national audience learned what they are really doing when they ought to be making important laws -- on, say, healthcare, welfare, that pesky speed limit.

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Friday, January 28, 2005

With My Lawyer Hat on . . .

. . . just for a moment (and forgive me), I'd like to venture that I am fully in agreement with the Washington Post's Editorial noting that during the confirmation process Attorney General nominee Alberto R. Gonzalez failed to unequivocally distance himself from the defense of torture ascribed to him, and arguing accordingly that the Senate ought not confirm him. To the extent the Editorial doesn't speak for itself, see further elucidation along the same lines from the NewDonkey. Money quote:

If you believe, as I do and I hope you do, that the war on terror is an ideological war in which perceptions of American values and good intentions are in the long run as important as military assets, then confirming the Poster Boy for Torture as Attorney General provides a propaganda victory for Islamic Jihadism that's potentially just as damaging as those images from Abu Ghraib. Moreover, Gonzales's confirmation will also reinforce the already dangerous impression that the United States will only obey those rules we get to set ourselves, an impression the administration finds ways to strengthen nearly every day.

A man sworn to uphold the law must believe in, and honor the law. Gonzalez has conclusively proven himself more pawn than paragon, more politician than advocate, and hence an unqualified and ill-suited candidate for the prosecutor-in-chief for these United States of America.

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